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Geallieerden POW's in Russische handen 
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Jelle Y.

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Bericht Geallieerden POW's in Russische handen
Ik ben in verhalen een paar keer tegengekomen dat geallieerden, die aan het eind van de oorlog door de Rusen bevrijd werden, niet zo maar naar geallieerde linies terug mochten keren. De Russen hielden dat soms weken tegen. In een enkel geval heb ik ook gelezen dat geallieerden ontsnapten om uit de handen van de Russen te komen.

Weet iemand waarom de Russen die geallieerden niet meteen repatrieerden of hun terugkeer tegenhielden?

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vr nov 12, 2010 2:21 pm
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Egbert

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Op de volgende website: http://darbysrangers.tripod.com/id66.htm kwam ik dit tegen:

Citaat:
THE EXPERIENCE OF AMERICAN POWS LIBERATED BY THE SOVIETS 1944 - 45

The principal effort of the American side of the World War II Working Group has been to research, using Russian and US archival sources, and analyze the wartime experience of those American prisoners of war liberated by the Red Army. The remainder of this report is an account of our findings to date.

This report will describe the process that brought thousands of United States military personnel who were prisoners of war held by the Germans (and one group held by the Japanese) into the hands of Soviet forces in the concluding weeks of World War II. Because those Americans liberated from German POW camps in Poland and central Germany constitute the largest number, the report will concentrate on that experience, although it also will examine the ordeal of POWs and internees who elsewhere had contacts with Soviet authorities. The report will describe in some detail the experience at specific German POW camps, some evacuated in the face of the Soviet advance, and some overrun by the Red Army. It will discuss what happened to those American prisoners whom the Germans tried to keep out of Soviet hands by marching them west, as well as what happened to those POWs the Soviets liberated. The narrative will address such issues as how the liberated prisoners were treated by the Soviets and how they were returned to US military control. The report will review those measures undertaken by both the Soviets and Americans in 1944 and 1945 to plan for, document, and account for the liberated prisoners and, importantly, will point out those organizational and practical problems that served to frustrate, complicate, and confuse an accurate accounting. It will analyze the contemporary evidence on the numbers of US POWs freed from German camps in the Soviet zone in the context of the overall postwar American casualty clearance and accounting process. This report will focus on what the documentary and other evidence indicates actually happened to American prisoners of war. It will not address Soviet motivation, hidden agendas, or possible political machinations.

On 11 June 1944, the US Military Mission to Moscow first informed Soviet authorities of the possibility that the Red Army advance into eastern and central Europe would uncover German prisoner of war camps and result in the liberation of US POWs who would require repatriation; that prospect seemed, particularly in light of subsequent events, not to have occurred to the Soviets. The military mission requested that the Red Army promptly inform American authorities when US POWs were liberated. Over the next several months the Americans made additional entreaties to the Russians on the subject but received little response. The Americans wanted to establish regular channels of communication for exchange of information on impending and actual liberation's, to stockpile POW relief supplies in reasonable proximity to those areas containing camps likely to be liberated, to insure Soviet agreement that American contact teams would be admitted promptly to the areas where liberated POWs were located, and to guarantee the quick evacuation and repatriation of the prisoners.

On 4 September 1944, General Deane, head of the military mission, appointed a board of officers led by Colonel James C. Crockett to prepare a comprehensive evacuation and repatriation plan. The plan they formulated incorporated in considerable detail the basic information exchange, supply, contact team, and evacuation concerns previously indicated. Even though on 8 September Deane had invited the Soviets to participate in a joint planning effort, there was virtually no Russian interest in the subject for several months. General Deane, Ambassador W. Averell Harriman, and American Chargeâ dâ Affaires George F. Kennan (who headed the American diplomatic mission in Moscow whenever Harriman was absent) frequently reiterated the American position on POW repatriation to their Soviet colleagues. Finally, on 30 November, the Soviet Foreign Commissar, V.M. Molotov, informed Kennan that his government agreed in principle to the American proposals. Still nothing further happened for another seven weeks.
On 21 January 1945, following liberation of the first US POW camp by the Red Army, General Deane met with Lieutenant General K.D. Golubev, deputy chief of the Soviet Repatriation Commission, to negotiate a POW agreement. They discussed terms of reciprocal treatment of liberated POWs. Their discussions formed the basis for a final agreement reached and signed on 11 February 1945, at the Yalta Conference between Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin. The principal provisions were:

- Liberating forces would maintain freed POWs in camps or at concentration points until turned over to their own governmental authorities.
- Liberating forces would immediately notify the home governments that the prisoners had been freed.
- Representatives of the governments of the liberated prisoners would have immediate access to the camps or points of concentration where they were held pending repatriation.
- The liberating country would be responsible for outside protection of the camps, while the internal administration would be under control of officials from the country of those liberated.
- The liberating country would provide adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical attention, until the prisoners returned to the authorities of their own country.
-Each country could use its own means of transport to repatriate its POWs held by the liberating power.

The USSR and United Kingdom also signed a similar POW agreement at Yalta. From the time the agreement was signed in early February until the end of March 1945, by which date the bulk of American POWs liberated by the Red Army in Poland had been evacuated from Odessa, diplomatic and military officials at the US embassy in Moscow worked to get Soviet compliance. In particular, the Americans wanted admission of contact teams to the Soviet zone of operations and rapid air evacuation of liberated prisoners. The effort, which included at least one letter from President Roosevelt to Premier Stalin on the subject, had little effect: "The actual implementation of the agreement broke down in nearly all respects because of Soviet failure to live up to any terms of the agreement." Thus, although "...all of the American prisoners known to have been liberated by the Red Army were eventually evacuated...", this was accomplished "under the most difficult conditions imaginable."

The Yalta POW accord specified that liberated prisoners would be transported promptly to agreed upon transfer points. Until late April 1945, Odessa was the only such transfer point. As Soviet forces moved westward, Odessa became further and further removed from the area where additional Allied prisoners likely would be found. US and British authorities did not want their liberated POWs moved eastward over a thousand miles to be repatriated through Odessa, when the front-lines of the Soviet Army and those of SHAEF forces were separated by only a hundred miles or less and were rapidly converging. The Russians agreed that overland exchanges of prisoners, not continued evacuation to Odessa, were the most practical solution as the war in Europe drew to a close. As the converging armies met in late April and early May, arrangements worked out between local commanders governed POW exchanges between the Soviets and the US and British.


Edit: link toegevoegd

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vr nov 12, 2010 2:37 pm
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Jelle Y.

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Bedankt.
Als ik het samenvat lees ik dat:
-over dit onderwerp tijdens de Yalta Conferentie afspraken over zijn gemaakt.
-de USSR en GB hier ook afspraken over maakten
-Dat het transfer-punt Odessa de enige was en dat het front onderwijl steeds verder opschoof naar het westen door oprukkend eRussische troepen.
-dat de USSR nou niet echt lekker meewerkte aan de bereikte akkoorden

De "waarom-vraag" blijft bij mij echter staan. Of was het niet meer of minder dan getreiter van Stalin?

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"The Navy can lose us the war, but only the Air Force can win it. The fighters are our salvation, but the bombers alone provide the means of victory." Winston Churchill


vr nov 12, 2010 3:13 pm
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Egbert

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Wellicht heb je iets aan deze informatie: http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_repo ... R351.2.pdf ?

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vr nov 12, 2010 3:41 pm
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Jelle Y.

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Da's 196 pagina's. Mij hoor je voorlopig niet meer :wink:

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Jelle
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"The Navy can lose us the war, but only the Air Force can win it. The fighters are our salvation, but the bombers alone provide the means of victory." Winston Churchill


vr nov 12, 2010 3:53 pm
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