Counter the attack, Panzer-Brigade 111 and 113
Panzer-Brigades 111 and 113 were both brigades of the heavier configuration of the 'second generation'. They also resembled the hastily build up of Panzer-Brigade 112. At the beginning of September they were considered fit for operations and earmarked for the planned counterattack against the U.S. 3rd Army near Nancy. Due to Allied air superiority the transportation by train was only possible during the night. The movement to the front also suffered from damage to the railways caused by air attacks. Finally both Panzer-Brigades arrived in the area around Lunéville on the 15th of September.
Originally Panzer-Brigade 107 and 108 were also destined to participate into the counterattack, but these troops were diverted to the northern sector of the Western Front after the British staged their ambitious airborne attack in the Netherlands. This left Panzer-Brigade 111 and 113 to clear the area east of Moselle, especially around the Marne-Rhine canal that stretched on the west-east axis south of Nancy. The expanding bridgehead over the Moselle threatened the separate the German 1st and 19th Army in Lorraine. For the Americans this bridgehead was a perfect staging area for an attack over the plains of Lorraine to the industrial Saar area outflanking the strong defence along the Moselle, including the fortresses of Metz and Thionville in the North. Not aware of each other plans both sides were concentrating tank troops in this vital area at the same time for offensive operations.
Before the planned German counterattack at September 18th the Americans were moving the U.S. 4th Armoured Division into the area of
Arracourt, just north of Lunéville, to stage their attack towards the Saar, planned on the 19th of September. The U.S. 2nd Cavalry Group was meanwhile trying to wrestle Lunéville from the tenacious German defence of 15th Panzer-Grenadier-Division. On the 15th of September everything looked fine for the Germans, because American attacks were beaten off, but the next day the American troops attacked with the help of the 4th Armoured Division and the Germans had to withdraw. During the 17th the Germans were infiltrating the town again, because it was considered a vital key to the planned operations of the Panzer-Brigades against the Moselle bridgehead on the 18th of September.
The Germans had made up the following plan: Panzer-Brigade 111 would - with the help of remnants of Panzer-Brigade 112 - attack south of the Rhine-Marne canal from Lunéville towards the Moselle to cut off the Allied supply over this river. Meanwhile Panzer-Brigade 113 and 15th Panzer-Grenadier-Division would clear the area around
Arracourt north of the Rhine-Marne canal. The southern attack took place under the command of XLVII Panzer-Corps and the northern attack resorted under LVIII Panzer-Corps, which were subjected to the German 5th Panzer Army under the command of Lieutenant-General Hasso von Manteuffel, a promising and relatively young officer with experience on the Eastern Front.
In the morning of the 18th of September the situation was confused in Lunéville, because the town was still contested by both sides. Still Corps-command of XLVII Panzer-Corps was under the impression that the town was well in German hands and send out Panzer-Brigade 111 to advance to the Moselle. Entering Lunéville the brigade became entangled in vicious street fighting with the 2nd Cavalry Troop, which took heavy casualties under the weight of the German superior numbers. The Americans had to withdraw but not before the reinforcements of the 4th and 6th U.S. Armoured Divisions had arrived. The German advance was effectively blocked and Panzer-Brigade made no further progress that day.
The Americans considered what the Germans planned as a major offensive as a local skirmish, part of the ongoing struggle for Lunéville. The Americans were not alarmed by the attack and meanwhile the 4th U.S. Armoured Division was preparing north of Lunéville for the attack to towards the Saar. These movements were carefully concealed from German reconnaissance. On the German side the setback of Panzer-Brigade 111 forced them to alter their plans and objectives. Now a combined attack in the Arracourt area by both Panzer-Brigades was planned to clear the area and take Nancy. Panzer-Brigade 111 would come from the south and Panzer-Brigade 113 would advance from the east, like a hammer and an anvil. For this purpose Panzer-Brigade 111 was handed over to LVIII Panzer Corps.
During the night movement through the Parroy woods towards the assembly area north of the Rhine-Marne canal Panzer-Brigade 111 got lost causing Panzer-Brigade 113 to attack alone. The attack of Panzer-Brigade 113 in the morning of the 19th of September was very promising, because although they did not know anything about the American strength they enjoyed tank superiority of at least two to one. Besides their movements were covered by autumn fog, which added an element of surprise and protected them from being spotted by the feared fighter-bombers. Nevertheless the Americans detected the German advance before the tanks could engage and prepared an ambush. This time the advantage of the fog was in American hands, because it enabled the tankers to engage the German tanks in close range. At the end of the day the Germans had lost more than 50 tanks, half the brigade's strength!
Frustrated by the failure of Panzer-Brigade 113 the German command moved in Panzer-Brigade from the south to attack the American positions around
Arracourt once more the following day. The Americans were surprised by a second attack to the rear of their troops, because CCA and CCB of the U.S. 4th Armoured Division were moving northwards again to push on towards the Saar. CCA was hastily turned around to engage the Germans and manage to block their advance in the ensuing tank battle, although this time they also took heavy casualties. Panzer-Brigade 111 surprised the Americans but was unable to turn this surprise into victory due to the quick American reaction.
Meanwhile the CCB of the U.S. 4th Armoured Division was advancing north and threatened the drive a wedge between the German 1st and 5th Panzer Armies. The disappointing results of the attacks and the appalling losses of the Panzer-Brigades brought great distress among the commanders, because the attacks had no significant effect on the American forces or positions. Ultimately Hitler held Johannes Blaskowitz, commander of Army Group G, responsible and he was subsequently sacked and replaced by Hermann Balck, who was highly experienced in armoured warfare on the Eastern Front. The change of command and the movement of both Panzer-Brigades to the endangered zone in north delayed the continuation of the attack for more than 24 hours.
On the 22nd of September the Germans attacked the area north of Arracourt and they enjoyed the cover of the morning fog, like on the 19th. They bumped into American Cavalry forces, which were protecting the main force of the American forces of the U.S. 4th Armoured Division. The Cavalry was no match for the Panzers, but they held the Germans long enough for the CCA to prepare a defensive screen of tanks and tank destroyers to await the Germans.
When the Germans broke through the fog started to lift and they were exposed to the full power of the American defence consisting of tanks, supported by numerous artillery batteries and squadrons of aircraft. What followed was an inferno of fire in which Panzer-Brigade 111 was practically annihilated. From the original 90 tanks and 2500 troops only 7 tanks and 80 men survived. The commander Colonel Heinrich von Bronsart-Schellendorf fell the same day. Von Manteuffel committed Panzer-Brigade 113 to give the attack another chance, but this brigade brought no change. It was purposeless destroyed on the 22nd and 23rd of September, leaving the commander, Colonel Erich von Seckendorf, dead on the battlefield as well.
The destruction of Panzer-Brigades 111 and 113 heralded the end of both the German offensive operations in Lorraine and the Panzer-Brigades as major battle formations. There were two kinds of failures concerning the deployment of the brigades. Firstly, due to lack of reconnaissance Panzer-Brigade 111 became entangled in street fighting in Lunéville and bad co-ordination made the brigade miss their rendezvous with Panzer-Brigade 113, which could have caused the U.S. 4th Armoured Division a major defeat. Secondly, although the Panzer-Brigades harboured a lot of tanks their objectives proved far beyond their capabilities, especially the deployment of untested and inexperienced crew against the seasoned American tankers proved fatal. The one-sided armament of the Panzer-Brigades combined with the lack of fire support made their mission suicidal against overwhelming American firepower.
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